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NOTES
LEGAL RELATIONS OF OWNERS OF PRESENT AND
FUTURE INTERESTS IN PERSONALITY-
CONSUMABLES
In the problem of protection of future interests in personalty one
question must be whether future interests can exist in personalty. This
problem has had a peculiar and long history and its adequate recount-
ing as an historical problem has been done elsewhere and needs no repe-
tition.'
Today the chief vestige of the hoary past lies in the rule that there
can be no future interests in consumables, an anachronistic survival
among personalty doctrines. The rule raises two question: 1) what is
a consumable and 2) to what extent can there be no future interest
in consumables.
The first question: what is a consumable, is largely a question of
fact. Actually it seems that there are two rules here which are often
confused. The first rule concerns things which are necessarily con-
sumed in their use and this group consists largely of foodstuffs. The
second rule concerns things whose use involves deterioration or diminu-
tion and in some cases annihilation and this group covers a wide variety
such as household goods, tools and the like. As to the first group:
foodstuffs, the rule is that there can be no future interests2 unless the
quantity is so large that no one would reasonably expect actual physical
consumption. The other rule concerning things whose use involves
deterioration is that the life tenant has free and unlimited use (short
of waste) and the remainderman gets whatever, if anything, is left.3
But a formalistic rule based on the form of the res has given way to a
freer classification, thus if the res is part of a stock in trade or is given
'Gray, Future Interests in Personal Property, 14 HARV. L. REv., 52 (1901).
2 Andrew v. Andrew, 1 Colby Ch. Cas. 686, 63 Eng. Rep. 598 (1845) ; Bryant v.
Easterson, 5 Jur. N.S. 166 (1859) ;- Phillips v. Beal, 32 Beav. 25, 55 Eng. Rep.
10 (1862); Underwood v. Underwood, 162 Ala. 553, 50 So. 305, 136 Am. St.
Rep. 61 (1909); Burnett v. Sister, 53 Ill. 325 (1870) ; Walker v. Pritchard,
121 Ill. 221, 12 N.E. 336 (1887); Buckingham v. Morrison, 136 Ili. 437, 27
N.E. 65 (1891); Gentry v. Jones, 6 J. J. Marsh 148 (Ky., 1831); Christler's
Ex. v. Meddis Adm., 6 B. Mon. 35 (Ky. 1845); Davison's Adm. v. Davison's
Admx., 149 Ky. 71, 149 S.W. 982 (1912); Healy v. Toppan, 45 N.H. 243, 86
Am. Dec. 157 (1864); Ackerman v. Vreeland, 14 N.J. Eq. 23 (1861); Rapalye
v. Rapalye, 27 Barb. 610 (N.Y., 1857); Holman's Appeal, 24 Pa. 174 (1854);
Robertson v. Collier, 1 Hill 370 (S.C., 1883); Calhoun v. Furgeson, 3 Rich.
160 (S.C., 1850) ; Wilson v. Gordon, 81 S.C. 395, 61 S.E. 85, 62 S.E. 593 (1908) ;
Henderson v. Vaulx, 10 Yerg. 30 (Tenn., 1836); Forsey v. Luton, 2 Head 183
(Tenn., 1858); Dunbar's Ex. v. Woodcoe's Ex., 10 Leigh 628 (Va., 1840).
The cases are gathered in Note, 77 A.L.R. 753 (1932).
3 Re Hall, 1 Jur. N.S. 974 (1855) ; Groves v. Wright, 2 Kay & J., 60 Eng. Rep.
815 (1856); Phillips v. Beal., supra, n. 2; Leonard v. Owen, 93 Ga. 678, 20 S.E.
65 (1893); Christler v. Meddis, supra, n. 2; Davison's Adm. v. Davison's
Adm., supra, n. 2; Field v. Hitchcock 17 Pick. 182 (Mass., 1835).
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together with another res in which future interests can exist, there
may be future interests.4 Occasionally anomalous cases arise. Such
was Sealwik v. Grimes in which the court refused to recognize a future
interest in a printing press.5
The other and important question is: to what extent is it true that
future interests cannot be created in consumables.
The Master of the Rolls, Sir William Grant, has given an historical
explanation" of the doctrine of consumables which has been frequently
quoted: "A gift for life of a chattel is now construed to be a gift of
the usufruct only. But, when the use and the property can have no
separate existence, it should seem that the old rule must still prevail,
and that a limitation over, after a life interest, must be held to be
ineffectual."
What rationale can support the rule? It is argued that a gift for
life in a consumable imports a power to consume and that such a power
is inconsistent with the existence of a future interest. This by analogy
to the case of a power of sale coupled to a life estate. But most cases
do not hold the latter a gift of the absolute interest.7
A strong argument, but one not often cited in the opinions, although
perhaps tacitly assumed, is that normally no effort is made to create
future interest in consumables and if they were permitted, undesirable
results would follow.
There are several limits to the rule that there can be no future
interests in consumables. Several cases provide that if the grantor were
clear as to his intent, he might vitiate the rule or circumstances just
pointed out, namely, gift of stock in trade or of consumables and an-
other res clearly not a consumable with the intent that they be a unit
may take the case out of the rule.
But the most important exception is the case where there is a gift
of a residue or a general bequest. In that case there is said to be a
duty on the executor to sell the goods and the future interests attach
4Howe v. Howe, (1849) 14 Jur. 359; But cf. Howe v. Dartmouth, infra, n. 9.
5 107 Md. 410, 68 Atl. 883, 16 L.R.A. N.S. 483, 126 Am. St. Rep. 400 (1907),
It has been suggested that the run of mine cases involving the holding
that a res is consumable do not necessarily involve holding that there can be
no future interest but may merely decide that there is a future interest in
whatever is left at the cessation of the first interest.
The present case involves holding that there can be no future interest in
consumables because here the court was dealing with what was left over after
the cessation of the first interest and the quarrel was between the heirs of the
first owner and the future owner. The heirs of the first owner prevailed, the
court holding there could be no future interest in consumables.
6 Randall v. Russell, 3 Merivale 190, 36 Eng. Rep. 73 (1817). -
7 Cf. Simes: Future Interests (1937) sec. 598.
8 Greggs v. Dodge, 2 Day 28 (Conn., 1805); Innes v. Polter, 130 Minn. 320, 153
N.W. 604, 3 A.L.R. 896 (1915) ; Healey v. Toppan, 45 N.H. 243, 86 Am. Dec.
159 (1864) : Saunders v. Haughton, 8 Ired. Eq. 217 (N.C., 1832) ; Patterson v.
Devlin, McMul. Eq. 459 (S.C., 1827); Madden v. Madden's Ex., 2 Leigh 337
(Va., 1830).
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to the proceeds. This rule was first stated in England in 1802 in Howe
v. Dartmouth.9 The rule is based on the implied intent of the testator.
Since future interests were stated and there may well be no property
to enjoy if the life tenant can consume it, the property must be con-
verted into income-yielding property and the income paid to the life
tenant. The distinction between a general or residuary gift and a
specific devise lies in the fact that in a specific devise the testator has
made it clear that he intends the life tenant to enjoy that particular
res. The rule of Howe v. Dartmouth is followed generally 0 but not in
Maryland 1 on the ground that such an intent as the rule involves is too
fictitious.
If a contrary intent is manifest, the rule of Howe v. Dartmouth will
be set aside.12
Included in the class of consumables to which the rule of Howe v.
Dartmouth applies are: leaseholds,'13 annuities,'1 4 and royaltiesY5 in
addition to the aforementioned foodstuffs and household goods.
9 7 Ves. Jr. 137, 32 Eng. Rep. 56, 25 Eng. R. C. 29 (1802).
10 Hinves v. Hinves, 3 Hare 609, 67 Eng. Rep. 523 (1844) ; Re Bates (1907) 1
Ch. 22, 6 B.R.C. 199; Prendergast v. Prendergast, (1850) 3 H. L. Cas. 195, 10
Eng. Rep. 75; Tickner v. Old, (1874) 18 Eq. 422; Harrison v. Foster, 9 Ala.
955 (1846); Burnett v. Lester, 53 Ill. 325 (1870); Welsch v. Belleville Sav.
Bank, 94 Ill. 191 (1876); Buckingham v. Morrison, 136 Ill. 437, 27 N.E. 65(1891); Balch v. Hallet, 10 Gray 402 (1858); Minot v. Thompson, 106 Mass.
583 (1871) ; Dexter v. Dexter, 274 Mass. 273, 174 N.E. 493 (1931) ; Healey v.
Toppan, 45 N.H. 243, 86 Am. Dec. 159 (1864); Ackerman v. Vreeland, 14
N.J.Eq. 23 (1861); Hull v. Eddy, 14.N.J.L. 169 (1833); Rowe v. White, 16
N.J.Eq. 411, 84 Am. Dec. 169 (1863); Howard v. Howard, 16 N.J.Eq. 486
(1864); Jones v. Stites, 19 N.J.Eq. 324 (1868); Coole v. Monkhouse, 47
N.J.Eq. 73 (1890) ; Ott v. Tewksbury, 75 N.J.Eq. 4, 71 Atl. 302 (1908) ; Coven-
hoven v. Shuler, 2 Paige 122 (N.Y., 1830); Cairns v. Chaubert, 9 Paige 160(N.Y., 1841); Spear v. Tinkham, 2 Barb. Ch. 211 (N.Y., 1841); Rapalye v.
Rapalye, 2-7 Barb. 610 (N.Y., 1857); Re Housman, 4 Dem. 404 (N.Y., 1886);
Re Kendall, 4 Dem. 133 (N.Y., 1885); and many later N.Y. cases; Smith v.
Barham, 2 Dev. Eq. 420, 25 Am. Dec. 721 (N.C., 1833); Jones v. Simmons,
7 Ired. Eq. 178 (N.C., 1851) ; Saunders v. Haughton, 8 Ired. Eq. 217 (N.C.,
1852); Ritch v. Morris, 78 N.C. 377 (1878); Simmons v. Fleming, 157 N.C.
389, 72 S.E. 1082 (1911); Henderson v. Vaulx, 10 Yerg. 30 (Tenn., 1836);
Golder v. Littlejohn, 30 Wis. 344 (1872).
"2 Evans v. Inglehart, 6 Gill & J. 171 (Md. 1834) ; Wooten v. Burch, 2 Md. Ch.
190 (1851).
There are dicta in several other jurisdictions against Howe v. Dartmouth.
12Alcock v. Sloper, 2 Myl & K. 699, 39 Eng. Rep. 1111 (1833) and a score of
succeeding English cases; Gay v. Focke, 291 Fed. 721 (1923); Harrison v.
Foster, 9 Ala. 955 (1846); Buckingham v. Foster, 136 Ill. 437, 27 N.E. 65(1891) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 Mass. 158, 158 N.E. 530 (1927) ;
Corle v. Monkhouse, 47 N.J.Eq. 73, 20 Atl. 367 (1890) ; Re Housman, 4 Dem.
404 (N.Y., 1886); Tayloe v. Bond, Busbee Eq. 5 (N.C., 1852); Deighmiller's
Estate, I Legal Gaz. 42 (1869); Robertson v. Collier, 1 Hill Eq. 370 (S.C.
1833); Vancil v. Evans, 4 Coldw. 340 (Tenn. 1867); Golder v. Littlejohn, 30
Wis. 344 (1872).
13 Re Game (1897) 1 Ch. 881; Frankel v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 152 App.
Div. 58, 136 N.Y. Supp. 703 (1912) affmd. 209 N.Y. 553, 103 N.E. 1124 (1913)
and in 168 App. Div. 634, 154 N.Y. Supp. 363 (1915).
'4 Sutherland v. Cooke, 1 Colby Ch. Cas. 498, 63 Eng. Rep. 516 (1844).
15 Re First Trust & Deposit Co., 210 App. Div. 575, 206 N.Y. Supp. 765 (1924).
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A contrary intent (opposing Howe v. Dartmouth) may be found
from an authorization or direction to retain' or to sell at a designated
time1 7 or at discretion Is or to pay rents.' 9
*EaRwI EssER NEMMmS.
EDITOR's NOTE: This article is the third part of a series relating to
Problems in the Legal Relation of Owners of Present and Future In-
terest in Personality, the first of which will appear in the March issue
of the Wisconsin Law Review, and is entitled "The Right of the Owner
of a Future Interest in Personality to Security"; the second part will
appear in either the February or March issue of the Michigan Law Re-
view, and is entitled "Some Problems in the Apportionment of Increase
Between Holders of Present and Future Interests in Personality."t
* Member of Wisconsin bar; Austin, Lehman and University fellow, Harvard
University.
tI The author acknowledges with thanks his debt to the late Jrofessor Joseph War-
ren and to Professor A. James Casner of the Harvard Law School for their
assistance in the preparation of this article.
16 Re Bates (1907) Ch. 22, 6 B.R.C. 199.
17 Daniel v. Warren, 2 Younge & C. Ch. Cas. 290, 63 Eng. Rep. 127 (1843).Is Re Pitcairn (1896) 2 Ch. 199; Robertson v. Collier, 1 Hill. 370 (S.C., 1833).
'9 Goodenough v. Tremamondo, 2 Beav. 512, 48 Eng. Rep. 1280 (1840).
1943] NOTES
